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) 
[L. A. No. 29342. In Bank. June 2,1967.] 
MICHAEL F. JEHL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SOUTH-
ERN P ACIFIC COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence-Discretion-Review: 
Damages-Inadequate Damages-Review of Order Granting or 
Denying New Trial.-An appellate eourt eannot find an abuse 
of diseretion in granting a new trial for insuffieiency of the 
evidenee on the adequacy of damages awarded unless it ap-
pears from the record that the verdict was adequate as a 
matter of law. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Inadequate Damagea.-The trial court did not abuse 
its diseretion in granting a new trial limited to the issue of 
d,amages on the ground that the jury award of $100,000 in 
damages was inadequate, where plaintiff's right leg was am-
putated below the knee and his left leg, seriously injured, 
became affeeted by permanent chronic osteomyelitis, where he 
suft'ered great pain for 16 months,: undergoing 18 operations, 
and would require treatment well into the future, and where 
his projeeted gross ineome until age 65, exceeding $500,000, 
was substantially redueed by his injuries, and the projeeted 
costs of his prosthetic applianees exceeded $15,000. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1 ] New Trial, § 99; Damages, § 92; [2] 
New Trial, § 82.1; [3] New Trial, 182.1; Damages, § 109; [4] 
Trial, § 227; New Trial, § 82.5; [5] Words and Phrases; [6, 11-15] 
Damages, § 109.5; New Trial, § 82.5; [7, 8] Damages, § 109.5; [9] 
Jury, § 5(1); [10] Jury, § 5(1); Trial, § 125; [16] Master and 
Servant, § 204, Damages, § 109.5; [17, 18] Master and Servant, 
1204(1) ; [19] Master and Servant, § 201. 
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[3a, 3b] Id.-Inadequate Damages: Damages-Inadequate Dam-
ages.-Error, as a matter of law, in the trial court's conclusion 
that a jury award of $100,000 in damages was inadequate, was 
not shown by defendant's evidence that plaintiff, a young man 
with serious leg injuries and resulting osteomyelitis, made no 
effort at rehabilitation, had not exercised or sought job coun-
seling and spent his days generally watching television, where 
such evidence at most indicated that he may have exaggerated 
his damages, and where the trial court could reasonably have 
concluded that plaintiff's pecuniary losses alone would exceed 
the amount of the verdict and that a substantial additional 
amount should be allowed for pain and suffering. 
[4] Trial-Verdict-Amendment by Jury: New Trial-Inadequate 
Damages - Additur. - Only if the jury allows damages so 
grossly inadequate as to show that it must have disregarded 
the evidence and the court's instructions, or the verdict is 
otherwise defective, should the jury be returned for further 
delibeFation under proper instructions; and if the trial judge 
believes that the damages are inadequate, but the verdict is 
not defective, the proper procedure is to set the verdict aside 
on motion for a new trial. 
[5] Words and Phrases - "Additur." - "Additur" is an order by 
which a plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of 
inadequate damages is granted unless the defendant consents 
to a specified increase of the award within a prescribed time • 
. [6a, 6b] Damages-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Procedure: 
New Trial-Inadequate Damages.-On a motion for new trial 
grounded on insuftlciency of the evidence because the jury 
award of damages is inadequate, the court, on determining 
that such damages are clearly inadequate and that the ease 
,vould be a proper one for granting the motion limited to dam-
ages, may in its discretion and in all such cases issue an order 
granting the motion unless the defendant consents to an ad-
ditur as determined by the court (overruling Dorsey v. Barba, 
38 Ca1.2d 350 [240 P.2d 604] ). 
[7a.-7c] Id. - Inadequate Damages - Additur - Constitutionality. 
-Although the practical effect of an additur is to give a 
plaintiff an award based on a finding made ultimately by the 
trial court, it does not detract from the substance of the 
common law trial by jury, nor violate the constitutional guar-
anty thereto (Cal. Const. Art. I, § 7). 
[8a,8b] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Nature a.nd Purpose. 
-Additur is a new procedure adopted to promote economy 
and efficiency in judicial proceedings. 
[9] Jury-Right to Jury Trial-Constitutional Guaranty-Opera,. 
------------------------------
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d. Damages, § 226; Am.Jur.2d. Damages, § 398. 
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tion and E1fect.-The guaranty of jury trial (Cal. Con st. Art. 
I, § 7) operates at the time of trial to )'equire submission of 
certain issues to the jury, and the effect of the constitutional 
provision, once a verdict has been returned, is to prohibit 
improper interference with the jury's decision. 
[10] Id.-Right to Ju1'7 Tria.l-Constitutional Guaranty-Scope: 
Trial-Province of Court and Jury.-That the framers of the 
Constitution did not regard the jury as the only competent 
trier of fact is shown by the acceptance over many years of 
the practice of the court determining fact issues in such rna t-
ters as admitting or excluding evidence, the court's jurisdic-
tion, sufficiency of pleadings and interpretation of documents 
and in such proceedings as equity, admiralty, probate, divorce, 
bankruptcy and administrative actions. 
[11] Damages-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Where Applica-
ble: New Trial-Inadequate Damages-Additur.-A court's 
power to issue an order of additur is not limited to those cases 
in which an appellate court would sustain either the granting 
or denial of a motion for new trial on the ground of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. 
[12] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Time for Defendant's 
Oonsent: New Trial-Inadequate Damages-Additur.-In an 
order of additur, the time which a court must pres~ribe within 
which the defendant must consent may not exceed the juris-
dictional period for granting a new trial, and if the defendant 
fails to consent within that time, the order granting the new 
trial becomes final. 
[IS] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Amount: New Trial-
Inadequate Damages-Additur.-If a court decides to order an 
additur, it should set the amount of damages which, in its 
completely independent judgment, it determines from theevi-
dence to b~ fair and reasonable, and it need not fix minimum 
or maximum amounts that it would have sustained on motion 
"for new trial or that would be supported by substantial evi-
dence and therefore sustainable on appeal. 
[14] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Rejection by Defend-
ant: New Trial-Inadequate Damages-Additur.-Jf a defend-
ant deems an additur excessive, he may reject it and seek to 
sustain the jury's award on an appeal from the order granting 
a new trial. 
[16] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Rejection by Plaintiff: 
New Trial- Inadequate Damages - Additur. - If a plaintiff 
deems an additur insufficient, he may raise the issue on an 
appeal from the judgment as modified by the additur. 
[16a, 16b] Master a.ndServant-Federal Employers' Liability Act 
-Actions-Additur Procedure: Damages-Inadequate Dam-
ages-Additur.-The additur procedure to deal with inade-
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quate awards of damages by juries is applicable to actions 
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in state 
courts. 
[17] Id. - Federal Employers' Liability Act - Actions - Law 
Governing.-In actions brought under the Federal Employers' 
Liability' Act in state courts, substantive rights are controlled 
by the federal law and procedural matters by the law of the 
forum. 
[18] Iel. - Federal Employers' Liability Act - Actions - Law 
Governing-Judge-Jury Relationship.-In actions brought un-
der the Federal Employers' Liability Act in state courts, the 
degree to which the judge-jury relationship is governed by 
federal law turns, not on U.S. Const. 7th Amend., which is not 
applicable to such actions, but on the U.S. Supreme Court'. 
interpretation of the act itself. 
[19] Id.-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Actions-Oonstruc-
tion of Act-Plainti1f'. Right to Reach Jury.-In actions 
brought under the Federa~.l Employers' Liability Act the plain-
tiJfs have a broad primary right to go to the jury on factual 
issues; a plaintiff has the right to reach the jury on the issue 
of liability when there is any evidence to support his case, 
even the slightest evidence, and even though the trial court 
would be forced to set aside a jury verdict for him and grant a 
new trial based on its view of all the evidence. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of LoS 
Angeles County granting a new trial limited to damages in an 
action for damages for personal injuries. Martin Katz, Judge. 
Affirmed unless the trial court in its discretion orders an 
additur to be accepted or rejected by defendaut within the 
time prescribed by the court. 
Randolph Karr, William E. Still, E. D. Yeomans and Nor-
man T. Ollestad for Defendant and Appellant. 
Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell and Edward 
J. Niland for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In this action to recover damages for 
personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
. (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.) and the Safety Appliance Act (45 
[17] Applicability of state practice and procedure in Federal 
Employers' Liability Act actions brought in state courts, note, 79 
A.L.R.2d 553. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Master and Servant, § 102 et 
seq.; Am.Jur., Master and Servant (1st ed § 455 et seq). 
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U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) defendant Southern Pacific Company ap-
peals from an order granting plaintiff a new trial limited to 
the issue of damages. The facts relating to plaintiff's injury 
may be briefly stated, for defendant does not challenge its 
liability. 
On June 19, 1962, at approximately 3 :25 a.m., plaintiff was 
working in defendant's railroad yard at South Gate, Cali-
fornia. He was then 19 years old and had been ·working for 
defendant for about 6 weeks. His job that night was to work 
as a field man. As railroad cars were switched onto the track 
he was working, plaintiff secured them by placing wooden 
blocks under the wheels. The blocking was necessary because 
the track was on a grade. Two cars failed to couple properly 
with cars already secured and began to roll back. The foreman 
told plaintiff to climb on the moving cars and secure them by 
means of the handbrake on each car. As plaintiff was doing so 
two other cars that had been sent up the track collided with 
the cars coming down the track. The impact threw plaintiff 
from the car he was riding and he fell under the wheels of onc 
of the moving cars, receiving severe injuries to the lower part 
of both legs. It was necessary to amputate his right leg below 
the knee. The left leg remains in jeopardy of amputation 
because osteomyelitis has developed in it. 
The jury returned a verdict for $100,000, and plaintiff suc-
cessfully moved for a new trial on the issue of damages on the 
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the ver-
dict in that the damages awarded were inadequate. (See Code 
Civ. Proc., § 657; Harper v. Superior Air Pa,rts, Inc., 124 
Cal.App.2d 91,92 [268 P.2d 115].) Defendant contends that 
the trial court erred in concluding that the damages were 
inadequate and therefore abused its discretion in granting 
plaintiff's motion. [1] An appellate court cannot find an 
abuse of discretion in granting a new trial for insufficiency of 
the evidence unless it appears from the record that the verdiet 
was adequate as a matter of law. (See Yarrow v. State of 
Oalifornia, 53 Ca1.2d 427, 434 [2 Cal.Rptr. 137, 348 P.2t1 
687] ; Bradford v. Edmands, 215 Cal.App.2d 159, 166-167 [30 
Cal.Rptr. 185].) No such adequacy appears here. 
[2a] Plaintiff's right leg was amputated below the knee; 
his left leg was so seriously injured that it may also have to 
be amputated. There is permanent, chronic osteomyelitis in 
the left leg that has required repeated surgical treatment amI 
may require recurrent treatment well into the future, and 
there is permanent limitation of motion in the left ankle. 
- ... 
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Plaintiff continues to suffer pains in his right leg. He was 
hospitalized for 16 months following the accident and under-
went 18 operations. Throughout this time he suffered great 
pain, necessitating extensive administration of pain-killing 
drugs. Had he not been injured, plaintiff's projected gross 
income from the date of the accident to the age of 65 would 
have exceeded $500,000. By substantially impairing his ability 
to compete in the labor market, his injuries materially re-
duced this expectable earning power. The projected costs of 
his prosthetic appliances exceeded $15,000. [Sa] It thus 
appears that the trial court could reasonably have concluded 
that plaintiff's pecuniary losses alone would exceed the 
amount of the verdict and that a substantial additional 
amount should be allowed for pain and suffering. [2b] Ac-
cordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in grant. 
iug a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages. 
[3b] 'Defendant contends, however, that because certain 
evidence favorable to it is so compelling, we should not apply 
the normal rule govcrning appellate review (see Bradford, v. 
Edmands, supra, 215 Cal.App.2d at pp. 166-167), but should 
make an independent determination of the adequacy of the 
jury '8 verdict without regard to the ruling of the trial court. 
The evidence in question consists of certain motion picture 
films taken of defendant without his knowledge; uncontra-
dicted testimony that he has made no effort at rehabilitation, 
has not exercised, has not sought job counseling, and spends 
his days generally watching television; and testimony that his 
prosthesis is not of the most advanced design and unneces-
s:lrily restricts his mobility. Defendant contends that this evi-
dence establishes that there should be a substantial improve-
ment in plaintiff's physical, mental, and emotional condition 
that will reduce his anticipated damages. At most this evi-
dence would indicate that plaintiff may have exaggerated his 
damages. It does not demonstrate that the trial court erred in 
eoncluding that the verdict was inadequate. 
[4] Invoking Crowe v. Sacks, 44 Ca1.2d 590 [283 P.2d 
(j89], defendant contends that the trial court erred in not 
I'(·t urning the jury for further deliberation under proper in-
st ructions, when it appeared that the damages were inade-
quate. There is no merit in this contention. Only if "the jury 
C1110ws damages so grossly inadequate as to show that it must 
have disregarded the evidence and the instructions of the 
('ourt," or the verdict is otherwise defective, should the jury 
"be returned for further deliberation under proper instruc-
June 1967] .TEIlL 1'. SOUTHERN PAC. CO. 
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tions. " (Crowe v. Sacks, supra, 44 Ca1.2d at p. 598.) If, on 
the other hand, "the trial judge believes that the damages are 
inadequate [but the verdict is not defective], the proper pro-
cedure is to set the verdict aside on motion for new trial." 
(Crowe v. Sacks, supra, 44 Ca1.2d at p. 599.) 
[5] [See fn. 1] Defendant contends that the trial court 
should have given defendant the option to consent to an ad-
ditur l before granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial. We 
consider this contention even though defendant did not direct-
ly request an additur in the trial court, for such a request 
would have been an idle act. (Civ. Code, § 3532; cf. Hudspeth 
v. Jaurequi, 234 Cal.App.2d 526,528 [44 Cal.Rptr. 428].) In a 
discussion with counsel at the time for motions after trial, the 
court made it clear that it would not order an additur. In-
deed, in light of this court's decision in Dorsey v. Bm'ba, 38 
Ca1.2d 350 [240 P.2d 604], holding additur to be unconstitu-
tional, the trial court would have been bound to deny an 
additur even if it had been specifically and directly requested. 
(Auto EquUy Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 450, 
455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].) 
Two questions must be resolved in considering defendant's 
contention. First, should the decision in Dorsey v. Barba, 
supra, 38 Ca1.2d 350, be overruled? Second, if so, can additur 
be applied in the present case, which arises under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. section 51 et seq. ? 
I. 
In Dorsey this court held that additur would deny a plain-
tiff's right to jury trial as guaranteed by article I, section 7, 
of the California Constitution.2 Although the Seventh Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution is not binding on the 
states'S and differs significantly in langunge from the Cali-
fornia constitutional provision,4 Dorsey relied in large part 
1" Additur" is used here to describe an order by which a plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages is granted 
unless the defendant consents to a specified increase of the award within 
a prescribed time. 
2Articlc I, section 7, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall be 
sccured t" all, and remain inviolate; ... " 
aSee, e.g., Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 [24 L.Ed. 436, 437]; 
WaZker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90,92 f23 L.Ed. 678, 679]. 
4The Seventh Ameuclmeut provides: "In suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial Ly 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules 
of the common law." (Compare fn. 2, supra.) 
- ) 
) 
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on Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 [79 L.Ed. 603, 55 8.Ct. 
296, 95 A.L.R. 1150]. (See Dorsey v. Barba, supra, 38 Ca1.2d 
at p. 357.) Dimick was a five-to-four deeision5 and has been 
vigorously eriticized.6 Like Dorsey, Dimick was based on an 
historical and logical analysis that was open to serious ques-
tion. Since additur did not exist at common law when the 
relevant constitutional provisions were adopted and since a 
plaintiff is guaranteed the right of jury trial as it existed at 
eommon law, additur was deemed a denial of that right. 
(D·imick v. Schiedt, supra, 293 U.S. at pp. 476-482 [79 L.Ed. 
at pp .605-609] ; Dorsey v. Barba, supra, 38 Ca1.2d at pp. 355-
359.) 
Doth courts were confronted with the argument that addi .. 
tur is no more a denial of a plaintiff's right to jury trial than 
remittitur is a denial of a d(·fendant's right. Although some 
faint historical foundation was found for this difference in 
tl'eatment,7' Dimick further relied on the tenuous ground that 
remittitur left standing a part of the jury's award, whereas 
additur constituted" a bald addition" to the verdict. S . 
[6al We have reassessed Dorsey and overrule it, finding its 
arguments unpersuasive when considered in the light of the 
demands of fair and efficient administration of justice. We do 
110t believe that defendants should be denied the advantages of 
additur when they are required to submit to remittitur. 
[7a, Sa] Even in Dorsey this court noted that the "constitu-
tional guarantee does not require adherence to the letter of 
:i.Justice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief .Justice 
Hughes and .Justices Brandeis and Cardozo concurred. . 
6See, e.g., Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W.Va.L.Q. 1, 18; 
.J ames, Remedies for Excessit'eness or Inadequacy of Verdicts : New Trial 
on Some or All Isslles, RI~mittitllr and Additur, 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 
143,154; Comment, 10 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 46; 23 Cal.L.Rev. 536, 537; 
14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 490; see also the comment in 44 Yale L . .J. 318, 323-324, 
on Schiedt v. Dimick (lst Cir. 1(34) 70 F.~d ;';'8. 
7Dimick v. Schicclt, S1lpra, !!93 U.S. at p. 484. 79 L.EIl. at p. 610. 
sD-imick v. Schiedt, supra, ~93 U.S. at p. 486, 79 L.Ed. at p. 611. There 
are several replies to this argument. In reaching the larger verdict in· 
volved in remittitur, the jury ha~ rejected all smaller amounts just U:J 
they have rejected all lal'ger amount8 in reaching the smaller verdict 
involved in additur. Neither verdict is more that of the jury than the 
other. (See Carlin, Remittiturs and Aclditurs, supra, 49 W.Va.L.Q. 1, 18, 
~-l-25; see also 44 Yale L.J. 318, 323.) Only additur retains all that waH 
contained in the jury's verdict, and in both additur and remittitur some-
thing is taken from the litigant who is relying on the verdict. (See 
Bender, Additur-The Power of the Tl'ial Court to De1lY a New Trial on 
the Condition that Damages be Increascd, California Law Revision Com-
mission, Recommendation and Study relatiug to Additur (Oct. 19(6) at 
pp. 617,647-648.) 
() 
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common law practice, and new procedures better suited to the 
efficient administration of justice may be substituted if there 
is no impairment of the substantial features of a jury trial." 
(Dorsey v. Barba, supra, 38 Cal.2d atp. 356.) We have COll-
eluded that additur is such a procedure. The demands of an 
"efficient administration of justice" must be considered in 
context. Since 1952, the year Dorsey was decided, there has 
been a tremendous increase in filings in civil cases including 
contested matters. Total dispositions in ordinary civil litiga-
tion increased more than fourfold during the 1952-1964 
period. (Compare Judicial Council of California, Fourteenth 
Biennial Report, Appendix A, pp. 102-104, with id., Twen-
tieth Biennial Report, Tables 11-20, pp. 143-153.)9 Of course, 
such practical considerations would be immaterial if additur 
impaired the right to a jury trial. We do not believe it does. 
In assessing the precedents, we search for the meaning and 
substance of jury trial and are not rigidly bound by the exact-
ing rules that happen to be' found on "the legal scrap heap of 
a century and a half ago." (Dimick v. 8chiedt, supra, 293 
U.S. at p. 495 [79 L.Ed. at p. 616] [Stone, J., dissenting] ; see 
People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 476 [268 P. 909, 270 P. 
1117].) [9] The guarantee of jury trial in the California 
Constitution operates at the time of trial to require submis-
sion of certain issues to the jury. Once a verdict has been 
returned, however, the effect of the constitutional provision is 
to prohibit improper interference with the jury's decision. At 
the time of the American Revolution, the English courts sel-
dom interfered with the amount of the jury's verdict in ac-
tions involving torts against the person. (See Mayne on 
Damages (11th ed. 1946) pp. 632-636; McCormick on Dam-
ages" pp. 26-27; Washington, Damages in Contract at Com-
mon Law, 47 L.Q.Rev. 345, 364.) The reason for their refusal 
to grant new trials in such cases was their view that determi-
nation of the amount of damages was within the exclusive 
province of the jury. (See, e.g., Beardmore v. Carrington 
(C.P. 1764) 2 Wils. 244, 249, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 793.) 
By the end of the 18th century, however, the Court of 
King's Bench accepted the doctrine that new trials would be 
granted in cases of torts against the person under appropriate 
'The social and eeonomic costs of crowded dockets increase every year. 
Additur's practical advantage in reducing these costs prompted the Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission to recommend legislation permitting 
aome forms of additur thought not to be inconsistent with Dorsey v. 
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circumstances (Jones v. Sparrow (K.B. 1793) 5 T.R. 257, 101. 
Eng. Rep. 144), but until the middle of the 19th century the 
English courts refused to grant new trials on the ground of 
inadequate damages (see Phillips v. London &- S.W. Ry. 
(1879) 5 Q.B.D. 78). rfhe unwillingness to interfere with the 
jury's decision, exemplified by the English courts, was a con· 
trolling consideration in the first California case to discuS::J 
the constitutional function of the jury with respect to the 
assessment of damages, Payne v. Pacific M(Jil S.S. Co., 1 Cal. 
33, where this court reversed an order granting a new trial 
unless plaintiff remit some of the jury's award. The plaintiff 
refused and appealed from the order granting a new trial. 
The court held that this interference with the right of trial by 
jury would result in "great abuse, if not the destruction of 
this right .... " (Payne v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., supra, 1 
Cal. at p. p7.) Although Pa.yne was approved the following 
year in George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365, the court held that the 
plaintiff's consent authorized remittitur and that defendants 
could not complain, because" the judgment stands for but one· 
half the amount, for which the verdict of the jury was rene 
dered." (Oeorge v. Law, supra, 1 Cal. at p. 365.) These early 
English and California cases illustrate that the right to jury 
trial was regarded as a protection to parties relying upon a 
verdict. The modern practice of granting new trials because of 
excessive or inadequate damages constitutes a limitation on 
the former broad powers of the jury. 
[7b] It is true that the practical effect of additur is to 
give the plaintiff. an award based upon a finding made ulti. 
mately by the trial court. [10] Courts often determine fact 
issues, however, and the acceptance of this practice over many 
years refutes the argument that the framers of the Constitu. 
tion regarded the jury as the only competent finder of facts. 
Decisions by the court admitting or excluding evidence at 
trial involve factual determinations as do those pertaining to 
the court's jurisdiction, the sufficiency of pleadings, and the 
interpretation of documents. Other instances of judicial or 
quasijudicial fact-finding are found in equity, admiralty, pro. 
bate, divorce, bankruptcy, and administrative proceedings. 
At the time of the American Revolution, there was no clear 
standard or practice governing the relationship between judge 
and jury. (See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh 
Amendment, 80 Harv.hRev. 289, 335-336.) If any reliable 
cone1usion can be drawn from t.he practice of that time, it is 
that plaintiff would not have had the right to a reassessment 
~) 
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of damages by a second jury; the first jury's determination 
of the amount of damages was conclusive. Reexamination of 
the damages issue following an inadequate verdict is a modern 
development. Had the English judges in the late 18th century 
been willing to give a plaintiff's motion for new trial any 
consideration at all, as judges do time and again today, there 
is good reason to believe that they would have used additur.tO 
Remittitur happened to develop earlier than additur be-
cause courts undertook to grant new trials for excessive dam-
ages long before they took similar action on the ground of 
inadequacy. (See McCormick on Damages, pp. 72-73; Wasll-
ington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 L.Q. Rey. 
345, 365, fn. 7.) The issue of additur was not presented until 
--modern times, but it is a logical step in the growth of the law 
relating to unliquidated damages as remittitur was at an 
earlier date. Its acceptance, though still somewhat retarded, is 
growing.ll It should not be treated differently from other 
modern devices aimed at making the relationship between 
judge and jury as to damages12 as well as to other matters,13 
lOA practice similar to additur was employed for some time prior to 
1791 in actions for mayhem. (See Carlin, Bemittiturs and .Ad~it'Urs, 
BUpra, 49 W.Va.L.Q. 1, 27; see also 44 Yale L.J. 318, 323.) , 
llSee, e.g., SmW, v. Ellyson, 137 Iowa, 391, 395-396 [115 N.W. 40]; 
Gensel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527. 529-534 [80 N.W.2d 854]; Volker v. 
P'rst Natt Bank, 26 Neb. 602, 606 [42 N.W. 731]; Fisch v. Manger, 
24 N.J. 66, 71-80 [130 A.2d 815]; Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 256-
261 [103 S.E.2d 357]; Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 45·46 [327 
P.2d 826]; Cordes v. Hoffman, 19 Wis.2d 236, 241 [120 N.W.2d 137]. Cf. 
Power8 v. All8tate In8. Co .• 10 Wis.2d 78, 87-92 [102 N.W.2d 393]. Until 
Power8 and Cordes, the Wisconsin practice concerning additur required 
the trial court to grant a new trial for inadequate damages unless tll(' 
defendant consented to the highest nmount a jury could reasonably award. 
(Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370 [214 N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771]; 
compare O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 472-473 [131 N.E.2d 883, 
56 A.L.R.2d 206].) Now the trial court is empowered to grant a reason-
able amount. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has concluded that this 
practice does not violate the right to jury trial. (See also Markota v. 
East Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 546, 552-559 [97 N.E.2d 13] (individunl 
opinion of Taft, J.).) 
12For example, both remittitur and a new trial limited to damages have 
been held not to deny the right to jury trial. (See Northern Pac. B.R. 
Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642. 646-647 [29 L.Ed. 155, 758, 6 S.Ct. 590]; 
George v. Law, 8upra, 1 Cal. 363, 365 [remittitur]; Gasoline Product.'1 
Co. v. Champlin eto. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499-500 [75 L.Ed. 1188, 1190-119]. 
51 S.Ct. 513]; Brewer v. Second Bapti8t Church, 32 Ca1.2d 791, 801 [197 
P.2d 713]; TayZor v. Pole, 16 Cal.2d 668, 675 [107 P.2d 614] [new trial 
limited to damages].) 
18For example, judgment notwithstanding the verdict is allowed in thjs 
state in eases where directed verdicts are proper. (Estate of Baird, 198 
Cal. 490, 506 [246 P. 324].) Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 
8M [57 L.Ed. 879, 33 S.Ct. 523], held the granting of a judgment not-
/) f--·· -- ._-
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one that preserves the essentials of the right to jury trial 
without shackling modern procedure to outmoded precedents. 
[7c] Additur does not detract from the substance of the 
common law trial by jury. [8b] Like its fraternal twin 
remittitur, now over 100 years old in this state, it promotes 
economy and efficiency in judicial proceedings. 
There is no essential difference between the procedures ap-
propriate for remittitur and additur, and we may therefore 
look to remittitur cases to determine the proper procedure for 
additur. 
[ab] Upon a motion for new trial grounded on insuftl-
ciency of the evidence because the damages are inadequate, 
the court should tirst determine whether the damages are clear- . 
ly inadequate and, if so, whether the case would be a proper 
one for granting a motion for new trial limited to damageS~­
(See e.g., Hamasaki v. ~lotho, 39 Cal.2d 602, 604-607 [248 
P .2d 910].) 14 If both conditions exist, the court in its discre-
tion-may issue an order granting the motion for new trial 
unless the defend·ant consents to an additur as determined by 
the court. The court's power extends to all such cases. 
[11] It is not limited to those cases in which an appellate 
court would sustain either the granting or denial of a motion 
for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. II 
[12] The court shall prescribe the time within which the 
defendant must accept the additur, and in no case may this 
time be longer than the jurisdictional period for granting a 
new trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 660; cf. McDonald v. Randolph, 
80 Cal.App.2d 367, 369 [181 P.2d 909].) If the defendant 
fails to consent within the prescribed time, the order granting 
the new trial becomes final. 
[18] If the court decides to order an additur, it should set 
the amount that it determines from the evidence to be fair 
withstanding the verdict to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, but the decision haa been thoroughly 
undermined by Baltimore 4" Carolina LiM v. Bedmml, 295 U.S. 654 (79 
L.Ed. 1636. 55 S.Ct. 890], and Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). See Neely v. Manita 
K. Eby COMtr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 321 [18 L.Ed.2d 75, 80. 87 S.Ot. 1072, 
1076]; Henderson. The Bac1cgrO'Und 0/ the Seventh Amendm.t, IUpra, 
80 Harv.L.Rev .• 289, 337. tn. 211. 
uThere was no contention in the present case that the jury's verdict 
was the result of passion or prejudice or that it was tainted by preju· 
dicial error occurring at trial. 
liS Since we overrule Dorsey, it is unnecessary to limit additur to thOlM 
cues where the jury'a verdict is aupported b;, substantial evidence. (Sec 
Code Civ. Proe •• I 662.5. added. by Stats. 1967. eh. 71, I 2; CaUtomia La .. 
Revision Commission Stud;,. supra, tn. 8, at pp. 608~610, 613·614.) 
) 
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and reasonable. In this respect it should exercise its com-
pletely independent judgment. It need not fix either the min-
imum or maximum -amount that it would have sustained on a 
motion for new trial or the minimum or maximum amount 
that would be supported by substantial evidence and therefore 
sustainable on appeal. [14] If the defendant deems the ad-
ditur excessive, he may reject it and seek to sustain the jury's 
award on an -appeal from the order granting a new trial. 
[15] If the plaintiff deems the additur insufficient, he may 
raise the issue on an appeal from the judgment as modified by 
the additur. 
II. 
[16a] It remains to be determined whether the trial court 
may order an additur in cases like the present one that arise 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
[17] In actions brought under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act in state courts, substantive rights are controlled 
by the federal law and procedural matters by the law of the 
forum. (Second Employers' Liability Oases, 223 U.S. 1, 55 
[56 L.Ed. 327, 348, 32 8.Ct. 169]; Garrett v. Moore-McOor-
mack 00., 317 U.S. 239, 244 [87 L.Ed. 239, 243, 63 8.Ct. 
246] ; Davee v. Southern Pac. 00., 58 Ca1.2d 572, 575 [25 
Cal.Rptr. 445, 375 P.2d 293].) For many years it seemed clear 
that additur would be classed as procedural. In 1916 the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amend-
ment had no application to actions brought under the Federal 
Employer's Liability Act in state courts, and accordingly a 
state could lawfully dispense with the unanimous verdict re-
quired at common law. (Minneapolis &- St. Louis R.R. 00. v. 
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217-223 [60 L.Ed. 961, 963-965, 36 
8.0t. 595] ; accord Ohesapeake &- Ohio Ry. 00. v. Carnahan, 
241 U.S. 241, 242 [60 L.Ed. 979, 981, 36 8.Ct. 594] [12 jurors 
not required] . ) 
In 1952, however, the Supreme Oourt held that" the right 
to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights· accorded 
by the Act to permit it to be classified as a mere' local rule of 
procedure' .... " (Dice v. Akron, Oanton &- Y. R.R. 00., 342 
U.S. 359, 363 [96 L.Ed. 398, 404, 72 8.0t. 312].) The court 
held that the question whether a release had been fraudulent-
ly obtained was one of fact for the jury, and that Ohio could 
not apply its general rule that such a fraud issue was to be 
decided by the court. 
• C.»-a'I 
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Neither in Dice, nor in the many cases following it, haa 
Bombolis been overruled. In Dice, in fact, it was expressly 
distinguished. (Dice v. Akron, Oanton &- Y. R.R. 00., supra, 
342 U.S. at p. 363, 96 L.Ed. at p. 404.) [18] Accordingly, 
we do not understand Dice to mean that the Seventh Amend. 
ment is a'pplicable to actions brought under the Federal Em. 
ployers' Liability Act in the state courts. Indeed, in noting 
that the right to trial by jury is "part and parcel of the 
remedy afforded railroad workers under the Employers Li-
ability Act," the court in Dice cited Bailey v. Central Vermo-nl 
Ry. 00.,319 U.S. 350, 354 [87 L.Ed. 1444, 1448,63 8.Ct. 1062], 
which held that the right to jury trial is derived from the act. 
(See also Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. 00., 352 U.S. 500, 508. 
510 [1 L.Ed.2d 493, 500-502, 77 S.Ct. 443].) The degree to 
which the judge-jury relationship is governed by federal law 
thus turns on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the act, 
rather than on the Seventh Amendment.16 
[19] In interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act the Supreme Court has insisted that plaintiffs have a 
broad primary right to go to the jury on factual issues. (See 
Rogers v. Missoori Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 [1 L.Ed. 
2d 493,500, 77 8.Ct. 443] ; cf. Note, 73 Barv.L.Rev. 1551, 15&3" 
1564; Supreme Oourt, 1951 Term, 66 Barv.L.Rev. 89, 162-164.) 
The cases before and since Dice illustrate the court's concern 
that plaintiffs reach the jury on the issue of liability whe):; 
there is any evidence, "even the slightest," (Rogers v. Mis· 
souri Pac. R.R. 00., supra, 352 U.S. at p. 506, 1 L.Ed.2d at p 
499) to support the plaintiff's case (see, e.g;, Ferguson v 
Moore-Mt!Oormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 [1 L.Ed.2d 511 
77 8.Ct. 457] ; Webb v. Illinois Central R.R. 00.,352 U.S. 51~ 
[1 L.Ed.2d 503, 77 8.Ct. 451] ; Dice v. Akron, Oanton &- j 
R.R. 00., supra, 342 U.S. 359; Wilkerson v. McOarthy, 33 
U.S. 53 [93 L.Ed. 497, 69 8.Ct. 413] ; Bailey v. Central Vet 
mont Ry. Co., 319 U.S. 350 [87 L.Ed. 1444, 63 8.Ct. 1062]: 
Thus, the court has insisted that a case must go to the jury j 
the evidence favorable to the plaintiff makes out a prima fac: 
16See also the court's statement in Dice that the "right to trial by ju' 
is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to peru: 
it to be classified as a mere 'local rule of procedure J for denial in , 
manner that Ohio has here used." (Dice v. Akron, Canton tf Y. B.B. C 
supra, 342 U.S. at p. 363, 96 L.Ed. at p. 404. (Italics added.) We do JJ 
understand the statement in Atlantic 4' Gulf Stevedores I'M. v. Ellerm 
Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360 [7 L.Ed.2d 798, 804, 82 S.Ct. 780], tl 
"the provisions of the Seventh Amendment •.. are brought into plaJ 
to be inconsistent with our conclusion, for that case was tried in t 
federal courta. 
-J 
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case, even though the trial court would be forced to set aside a 
jury verdict for the plaintiff and grant a new trial based on 
its view of all the evidence. (Wilkerson v. McCarthy, supra, 
336 U.S. at p. 57, 93 L.Ed. at p. 502.) The court may have 
believed that trial courts are reluctant to overturn jury ver-
dicts and therefore concluded that more liberal directed ver-
dict standard might adversely affect a plaintiff's chances of 
recovery. (See Note, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1551, 1563.) 
[16b] Additur does not deprive a plaintiff of the right to 
go to the jury on any issue or impair the substance of the 
right to trial by jury. It operates only in the event a plaintiff 
is dissatisfied with the jury's verdict. It will have no effect on 
the activities of railroads and their employees and no substan-
tial effect on the outcome of litigation between them- At the 
same time, it will help implement this state's strong interest 
in the fair and efficient administration of a voluminous 
amount of litigation. (Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge etc. Coopera-
tive, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 539-540 [2 L.Ed.2d 953, 963-964, 78 
S.Ct. 893].) Moreover, since the Seventh Amendment is not 
applicable we are not bound by Dimick or the amendment's 
reexamination clause, which carries the federal Constitution 
beyond the substance of the common law right to trial by 
jury.l'l (Cf. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 [7 
L.Ed. 732, 737].) The California Constitution contains no 
such clause, and neither it nor the federal act forbid additur 
just as they do not forbid remittitur. (Cf. Union Pac. R.R. 
00. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 334 [62 L.Ed. 751, 755, 38 S.Ot. 
318] ; Oomiskey v. Pennsylvania R.R. 00. (2d Cir. 1956) 228 
F.2d 687, 688.) . 
The order granting a new trial limited to damages shall 
stand affirmed unless the trial court in its discretion and in 
aCcordance with the views expressed in this opinion orders 
an additur within 30 days after its receipt of our remittitur. 
If an additur is ordered,· it shall be accepted or rejected by 
defendant within the time prescribed by the trial court, but 
1 "The most plausible explanation tor DWnick is that it rested on the 
reexamination elause ot the Seventh Amendment, as opposed to the clause 
guaranteeing that the right to jury trial "shall be preserved." (See 
Btmder, 8'Upra, fn. 8, at p. 627, fn. 53.) Moreover, it is doubtful that 
DWnicl; would be followed today .. (See, e.g., Genzel v. Halvorson, supra, 
248 Minn. 527, 531; Fisch v. Manger, 8'Upra, 24 N.J. 66, 74.) There is 
also authority that the present case is distinguishable from Dimick on its 
tacts. (See United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield .AS81/.. (5th 
Cir. 1938) 99 F.2d 830, 834, cert. den.), 306 U.S. 646 [83 L.Ed. 1045, 59 
S.Ot. 587] and tn. 14, supra.) 
the court shall not prescribe a period of time longer than 30 
days from the date of its order. Plaintiff shall recover his 
costs on appeal. 
McComb, J., Peters, J.1 Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
